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INTRODUCTION
The large percentage of aircraft incidents and accidents attributed to '_uman error"
has focused increasing attention upon the performance characteristics of the individual
pilot. Traditionally, human factors specialists have channeled their research energies
toward exploration of the human information processing and perceptual aspects of the
pilot's job with the important goal of designing equipment best suited to the
characteristics of the human operator. Human factors psychologists and aeronautical
engineers have continually refined designs on the basis of an improved understanding of
human operators to the extent that each new generation of aircraft not only promises
better performance, but also reduced pilot workload. Despite this effort, about 65
percent of all accidents continue to fall into the human error category.
As a direct result of the limitations and imperfections of individual humans, multi-
piloted aircraft cockpits were designed to ensure needed redundancy. Yet, this
redundancy has failed to provide an adequate margin of safety in some cases. It has
failed too often because captains have not heeded the warnings of other crewmembers. It
has failed because crewmembers who possessed adequate information have for some
reason not provided it to others. In fact, a review and analysis of jet transport accidents
worldwide during the period from 1968 to 1976 (Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1979)
revealed more than 60 in which breakdowns of the crew performance process played a
significant role. Although individual pilot performance remains an important research
topic, these occurrences suggest that more attention need be placed upon crew
performance and the factors which affect crew coordination.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1961) defines cockpit as, '_. region noted for
many conflicts." Although this definition does not specifically apply to aircraft cockpits,
we have found it interesting to note how often interpersonal phenomena can affect air
transport operations. Since the cockpit crew is a highly structured small group, a
number of socio-psychological, personality, and group process variables are relevant to
crew effectiveness. The complexities of the operational environment, aircraft systems,
and the sheer volume of information that must be processed (often in brief periods of
time), mandate highly coordinated team performance. Rigorous company hiring
practices, employment conditions, and regulations requiring frequent checking and
retraining have together assured that each crewmember is a highly skilled professional.
However, in situations where a high level of teamwork is required, the individual skills of
1 EDITORS' NOTE: This paper orginally appeared in Amerie6tt P.yeh_o_st, $#, August, 1984. Because it di_uues
many of the theoretical and practical issues related to CRM training, it is reprinted here.
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team members are often not enough to guarantee satisfactory outcomes in all situations.
Jones (1974) illustrated this assertion in a study of professional athletic teams. Teams
with better athletes seem to win more often, but the strength of this relationship is
dependent on the extent to which the particular sport requires teamwork. Jones found
that 90% of baseball team effectiveness was predictable from the skills of individual team
members, while only 35_ was predicted by this factor in basketball teams. In explaining
this result, the author notes that basketball is critically dependent upon personal
relations and teamwork.
Despite the fact that thousands of studies of group performance have implicated
many variables (Hare, 1972; McGrath & Altman, 1966), group performance problems
have received relatively little attention in the aviation research and training
communities. However, awareness of these problems is gradually increasing. Following
an airline accident in 1978, in which the crew was preoccupied by a minor mechanical
malfunction and allowed the aircraft to run out of fuel, the U. S. National
Transportation Safety Board, a government organization whose major responsibility is
the investigation of transportation mishaps, stated in their report of the accident
(NTSB, 1979b):
The Safety Board believes that this accident exemplifies a recurring problem--a
breakdown in cockpit management and teamwork during a situation involving
malfunctions of aircraft systems in flight. To combat this problem,
responsibilities must be divided among members of the flightcrew while a
malfunction is being resolved ....
Admittedly, the stature of a captain and his management style may exert
subtle pressure on his crew to conform to his way of thinking. It may hinder
interaction and adequate monitoring and force another crewmember to yield his
right to express an opinion. (pp. 26-27)
In 1982, subsequent to an accident in which the aircraft struck a bridge shortly after
takeoff and crashed into the Potomac River, the Board (NTSB, 1982) ruled that the
captain of that aircraft did not react to the copilot's repeated, subtle advisories that all
was not normal during the takeoff. Moreover, the Board implied that the copilot's lack
of assertiveness (possibly induced by the inherent role structure of the cockpit) may have
been a causal factor in recommending that pilot training include I_=onsiderations for
command decision, resource management, role performance, and assertiveness." (pp. 67-
68)
It is unfortunate, in light of the increasing awareness of group performance variables
in air transport operations and the volume of research dealing with group function, "that
we still know little about why some groups perform better than others. There are at
least two principal reasons for this apparent shortcoming. First, it is difficult to
assimilate the sheer number of variables that can potentially affect group processes.
This poses methodological difficulties that have forced those concerned with group
performance to attempt to isolate a few variables at a time in any given experiment.
Thus, the literature is characterized by a collection of seemingly inconsistent results,
each study examining the effects of a different subset of relevant factors. The second
point concerns the fact that most of the closely controlled studies have taken place in
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laboratory settings. Given the obvious difficulty of maintaining experimental control in
the real world, we have relied upon more comfortable environs. As Helmreich (1975) has
noted, we may have sterilized our research through an over-reliance on the laboratory,
the result being that organizational decision-makers in the aviation community and
elsewhere have been less likely to concentrate on solutions to group performance
problems. They have instead focused on the more manageable problem of what to do
about individual performers.
It would appear that a partial explanation of the inconsistency and lack of
robustness of the literature is inherent in the research methodology itself. The practice
of looking at isolated variables has contributed to a state of affairs where factors that
make big differences in group behavior are held constant because they are neither easily
controlled nor manipulated in the laboratory and where potentially important
intervening variables are often ignored. As Hackman and Morris (1975) have noted,
most studies examine only parts of a complicated phenomenon such as the contribution
of input factors (e.g. member skills, attitudes, and personality) to the outcome factor
(e.g. group productivity), ignoring that it may be the process of group interaction that
holds the key to understanding group performance. For example, a study examining the
effect of group member personalities (an input) on performance (the output) might
discover meager or non-existent statistical associations, and as a result one may infer
that such profiles are unrelated to group performance. Yet, this inference may be
entirely incorrect. It is possible that the same personality profiles would be strongly
related to intervening process variables such as communication patterns or other
interactional behavior. These process variables, in turn, might be related to the outcome
variable. Thus, mediating variables might account for most of the relationship, but have
often been overlooked.
The group interactional process has been alternatively viewed as both a positive and
negative feature of tasks performed by groups instead of by individuals. Hackman and
Morris (1975) have noted that, v_t is tempting to conclude that the 'group effectiveness
problem' will not be solved in the foreseeable future, and to recommend to decision-
makers that in the meantime they use groups as infrequently as possible." Steiner (1972)
characterizes group performance in terms of '_rocess-loss" which inhibits the group from
reaching its potential. Others (e.g. Hackman & Morris, 1975) propose that interaction
among group members performs the valuable function of preventing errors that may
occur if individuals perform the task in isolation; and that despite the inefficiency of the
process, it is acceptable in any situation where error-free performance is necessary. This
notion, that substituting groups for individuals results in error-free performance through
redundancy, has been challenged. Janis (1972) proposes that this process is frequently
compromised by '_groupthink" in close-knit groups, a phenomenon characterized by a
marked decrease in the exchange of discrepant or unsettling information, even when it is
forced to the attention of members.
In the sections that follow, I will review some of the input, process, and outcome
variables in the small group performance situation faced by aircraft flightcrews. A
strong emphasis is placed upon the group process. Hackman and Morris (1975) have
argued eloquently for this approach, and their work has been a stimulus for this
application. More specifically, the focus here will be upon links between personality or
interpersonal styles of leadership as input variables; communication patterns and crew
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coordination as group process variables; and upon operational errors, incidents, and
accidents as outcome variables. A concluding section reviews some of the ways that the
air carrier industry is now addressing group performance problems.
In some sense, this application of small group theory to the flight deck is facilitated
by the fact that we are dealing with groups operating within a tightly prescribed
operating environment (relative to many group tasks) and with a clearly defined role
structure (captain, first officer, and second officer or flight engineer). Thus, certain input
factors such as task characteristics, reward structure, position power, stress levels, etc.
are relatively constant within this particular type of group.
INPUT VARIABLES AND THE FLIGHTCREW PROCESS
There are numerous input conditions that affect the group interactional process, but
member personality characteristics and individual differences have probably received the
most attention. Moreover, organizations concerned with pilot selection have utilized
personality inventories for years, but as Helmreich has noted (In Cooper, White, &
Lauber, 1979), such efforts have usually been oriented toward the screening of
pathology.
In the group research domain, leadership studies have concentrated heavily upon
the identification of P_)rofiles" or personality characteristics which are associated with
successful leadership. Fiedler (1967) and coworkers undertook an ambitious program to
identify those profiles most pertinent to successful leadership. It is impossible to detail
the findings of this program here, but briefly stated, Fiedler identified two basic types of
leadership profiles_ task-oriented and relationship-oriented, which were related to group
performance in a complicated interactive fashion. Not surprisingly, the type of
leadership, style that was most effective was heavily dependent on the type of group and
the task with which the group was charged. In groups with highly structured tasks and
powerful leader positions, such as the cockpit crew, task-oriented leaders performed
better as long as interpersonal relationships within the group remained relatively good.
Relationship-oriented leaders performed better in groups where leader-member relations
where relatively poor. These data are interesting, but appear intuitively paradoxical. It
would seem logical to posit that relationship-oriented leaders, over time, would more
often find themselves in situations characterized by good interpersonal relations; whereas
task-oriented leaders would more often find themselves in situations where leader-
member relations are poor. While the Fiedler data may be valid for the situations
tested, it could be argued that relationship-oriented leaders less frequently find
themselves in situations where leader-member relations are poor. However, there are
apparently no data on the relative frequencies of these patterns.
Another characteristic of this approach is that task-orientation and relationship-
orientation profiles are usually treated as mutually exclusive patterns. Yet, a substantial
amount of research dealing with these two global dimensions would seem to indicate that
this is not the case (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 1978; Spence & Helmreich, 1978). Spence and
Helmreich (1978) have conducted research that argues persuasively for the idea that
instrumentality, or goal orientation, and expressivity, or interpersonal orientation, are
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orthogonal.Blakeand Mouton (1978) suggest that the most effective style of leadership
or management is associated with a profile that encompasses both sets of characteristics.
Thus, there is increasing interest in the notion that both task orientation and
interpersonal orientation are necessary for the effective management of all situations.
The concept that these two sets of attributes can be present in one individual and
balanced depending on the situation is perhaps a more appealing concept for decision-
makers than theories that suggest an inverse relationship between the two. Previous
approaches (e.g. Fiedler, 1967) have speculated that the decision-maker should assign
managers to situations more in keeping with their particular leadership style.
Unfortunately, this is not practical in many environments, but perhaps even more
problematic is the fact that most management situations are dynamic and in constant
evolution.
With respect to the flight deck, as in most performance situations, it has usually
been assumed that goal orientation is strongly related to performance and that group
orientation is essentially unrelated. However, Helmreich (1982) has presented data which
would seem to indicate otherwise: In a study of air carrier pilots, both goal and group
orientations were significant predictors of the group process variable of crew
coordination.
As previously suggested, the incident and accident record has also implicated the
lack of an effective interpersonal orientation as a cause of breakdowns in the group
process variable of information exchange. Subordinate crewmembers complain that
captains are at times so insensitive and intimidating that they hesitate to speak up even
in potentially dangerous situations. We have identified the extent of this problem, in
part, through a confidential data base, the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS),
which is a joint endeavor of NASA and the Federal Aviation Administration. This data
base (which currently contains around 50,000 reports from pilots, air traffic controllers,
and other members of the aviation community) has proven to be an invaluable tool for
the identification of significant problem areas.
I recently reported an example of this type of behavior contained in a copilot report
to ASRS (Foushee, 1982, p. 1063). Air traffic control had issued a speed restriction
which was repeatedly ignored by the captain. After several attempts to convey the
information, the captain responded by saying, _l'll do what I want." Air traffic control
inquired as to why the aircraft had not been slowed, advised the crew that they had
almost collided with another aircraft, and issued a new clearance which was also
disregarded by the captain despite repeated clarification by the copilot. Following the
last advisory from the copilot, the captain responded by telling the copilot to, ']ust look
out the damn window."
The inherent danger of such situations is that subordinate crewmembers can become
"conditioned" not to speak up after running into captains such as the one in the
preceding report. Consistent behavior of this sort by captains (while not usually as
blatant as in this example) may have contributed to the development of a normative
pattern of what constitutes "appropriate copilot behavior," and there is a strong
likelihood that this behavioral norm will transfer to situations where there is no reason
for member effort to be suppressed.
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Another report from a copilot to ASRS (Foushee, 1982) illustrates this phenomenon.
This report described a situation where air traffic control had instructed the flight to
level off at 21,000 feet. As they reached their assigned altitude, the copilot noticed that
the captain was climbing through it. The copilot mentioned it to the captain, _)ut not
forcefully enough and he did not hear me." The copilot mentioned it again and pointed
to the altimeter at which point the captain stopped the climb and descended back to the
assigned altitude. Assigned alitudes are extremely critical in dense air traffic
environments, and strict adherence to these altitudes is necessary because of the
likelihood that other aircraft are assigned to adjacent airspace. Because of this, the
copilot was extremely concerned about the incident and summed up the reasons for this
occurrence in the following insightful manner:
The captain said he had misread his altimeter and thought he was 1000 ft.
lower than he was. l believe the main factor involved here was my reluctance
to correct the captain. This captain is very _pproachable f_ and I had no real
reason to hold back. It is just a bad habit that I think a lot of copilots have of
double-checking everything before we say anything to the captain. (p. 1063)
It should come as no great surprise that this situation can produce, and has
produced, disastrous consequences. In a 1979 crash of a north-eastern commuter carrier
(NTSB, 1980), the first officer failed to take control of the aircraft when the captain
apparently became incapacitated. The captain was a company vice-president and the
first officer was a recently hired pilot still on probation. The captain, according to
reports, was a gruff personality and was observed to be visibly upset on the day of the
accident. Further, this captain apparently had a history of not acknowledging cockpit
communications. Clearly, the group dynamics of that particular situation were not
conducive to the first officer's assumption of control. It would appear that had the first
officer not been intimidated, the accident might not have occurred. In another accident
(NTSB, 1979a), a twin-jet slid off the end of the runway after crossing the outer marker
approximately 60 knots over desired speed. Although the captain was apparently
unaware of the excessive speed, evidence indicates that the first officer knew, but could
only muster a sheepish comment about the possible presence of a tail-wind.
It is reasonable to assume that the development of a strong group norm of shared
responsibility will increase the probability that subordinate crewmembers will function
more effectively in critical instances. Obviously, the captain's leadership style is an
important component for the establishment of such a norm, but it is by no means the
only component. Apparently, the reluctance to question captains or assume control is
not an isolated problem. In an investigation conducted by Harper, Kidera, and Cullen
(1971) at a major air carrier, captains feigned subtle incapacitation at a predetermined
point during final approach in simulator trials characterized by poor weather and
visibility. In that study, approximately twenty-five percent of these simulated flights
_ait the ground" because, for some reason, the first officers did not take control.
While there are no carefully controlled studies of the effects of leader and member
personality profiles, such as instrumentality and expressiveness, on the flightcrew
interactional process (although Helmreicb, Note 1, provides some evidence), incident and
accident data suggest that such profiles are important predictors of certain group process
variables in the aviation environment. Research now in progress in our laboratory will
270
hopefully shed more light on these relationships.
FLIGHTCREW PROCESS VARIABLES AND PERFORMANCE
Researchers in the aviation environment are perhaps more fortunate than many of
our laboratory research colleagues. The rapid advancement of simulator technology has
provided an ideal laboratory for the study of group process variables. It is now feasible
to realistically simulate virtually every aspect of the aircraft operational environment
(complete with realistic auditory, visual, and motion cues) to the point where actual
trips can be _lown" in a simulator, and these t_lights" are almost indistinguishable from
those in the airplane. Due to the high degree of simulator fidelity, it is possible to
conduct controlled studies of group process variables with almost complete confidence
that the results generated in the simulator are strongly (if not completely) representative
of the real world (Lauber & Foushee, 1981). Moreover, the simulator allows the study of
situations that are too dangerous to perform in an actual aircraft.
The best example of this use of simulation was conducted by H. P. Ruffell Smith
(1979) in a study which was not originally designed as an investigation of group process,
but which provided strong evidence for the importance of the group performance
dimension. In that study_ B-747 crews were asked to fly a highly realistic simulated
flight from New York to London. Because of an oil-pressure problem, the crew was
forced to shut down an engine. Since the trip to London could not be completed with a
failed engine, the crew had to decide where to land the airplane, and the decision was
further compounded by a hydraulic system failure, poor weather, less than ideal air
traffic control, and a cabin crewmember who consistently requested assistance from the
cockpit crew at inopportune moments. The Ruffell Smith (1979) study allowed the
examination of flightcrew performance in a completely controlled setting, and there were
marked variations in the performance of the crews. Perhaps the most salient aspect of
this flight simulation study was the finding that the majority of problems was related to
breakdowns in crew coordination, not to a lack of technical knowledge and skill, t_Iigh
error" crews experienced difficulties in the areas of communication, crew interaction, and
integration. For example, some of the more serious errors occurred when the
performance of an individual crewmember was interrupted by demands from other
crewmembers. Other performance deficiencies were associated with poor leadership and
the failure of the flightcrew to exchange information in a timely fashion.
One of the most significant group process variables is reflected by the information
flow within the group. The measurement of relational communication has been utilized
over the years by a number of researchers in various paradigms (e.g. Bales, 1950; Mark,
1970). In studies that have examined the relationship between group process variables
and performance effectiveness, careful analyses of the communications process have often
proven fruitful. Lanzetta and Roby (1960) monitored and recorded all communications
during a group performance task. Their study found that this particular measure of
group interaction predicted task success better than such measures as member
knowledge and skill. These authors suggest, in a quote that might as easily have come
from one of the NTSB accident reports, that t_he way the group 'utilizes' its resources
and the procedures it employs for communicating essential information are as important,
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if not more important than 'knowledge' of the problem for determining its performance."
In a separate investigation designed to look at the group process, we (Foushee &
Manos, 1981) analyzed the cockpit voice recordings from the Ruffell Smith (1979)
simulation study utilizing a technique adapted from Bales' (1950) interaction process
analysis. Several interesting relationships emerged from the Foushee and Manos (1981)
study. Overall, there was a tendency for crews who communicated less not to perform as
well, but the type or quality of communication played an even more important role.
There was a negative relationship between crewmember observations about flight status
and errors related to the operation of aircraft systems. In short, when more information
was transferred about aspects of flight status, fewer errors appeared which were related
to such problems as mishandling of engines, hydraulic, and fuel systems, the misreading
and missetting of instruments, the failure to use ice protection, and so forth.
It would appear that information exchange of this sort facilitates the development
or coordination of strategies through the assurance that all members have access to the
relevant information. However, there may be a negative side to the complete
coordination or sharing of strategic plans unless group norms specifically allow for the
processing of discrepant information. As Janis (1972) has pointed out, group processes
often lead to situations where information discrepant with the group's strategic course of
action is ignored or deemphasized, even when it is critically relevant. This can
theoretically occur not only in groups where interpersonal relations are strained, but also
in groups where there is too much agreement.
In other areas of information exchange, Foushee and Manos (1981) found a negative
relationship between aircraft systems errors and acknowledgements to information
provided by other crewmembers. In crews in which commands, inquiries, and
observations were frequently acknowledged, these types of errors were less apparent.
Acknowlegements were also related to fewer errors overall. It appeared that
acknowledgements served the important function of validating that a certain piece of
information had, in fact, been transferred. These types of communication also seemed to
serve as reinforcements to the input of other crewmembers. This relationship suggests
that communication patterns can serve to increase member effort and motivate further
participation in the group process.
Commands were associated with a lower incidence of flying errors such as problems
with power settings, neglect of speed limits, altitude deviations, and the lack of formal
transfer of control between captain and first officer. Often communications of this type
seem to assure the proper delegation of cockpit duties and facilitate coordination and
planning. Yet, it should be noted that the overuse of imperative statements may have
negative consequences. The use of commands provides a very good illustration of the
effect of varying interpersonal styles. An identical piece of information can be related to
other crewmembers in one of several different ways. For instance, a communication such
as, "Ask air traffic control for a higher altitude," which would constitute a command;
could also be relayed, "l think we should ask air traffic control for a higher altitude," an
observation; or '_Yhy don't we ask air traffic control for a higher altitude," an inquiry.
Foushee and Manos (1981) also found evidence for higher rates of response
uncertainty, frustration or anger, embarrassment, and lower rates of agreement in crews
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who tended to make more errors. Despite the fact that these correlational data do not
allow inferences of causation, it is safe to infer that discord related to the comission of
errors, whether cause or effect, may be related to crew coordination deficiencies
downstream.
In addition to the importance of communication style, the precision of
communication plays a pivotal role. The ASRS data bank contains a number of
incidents in which each pilot thought he or she knew what the other meant or intended
to do when, in reality, they did not. One report to ASRS described a situation where a
critical alarm went off in the cockpit followed by immediate diagnostic actions by the
crew. Shortly thereafter the alarm silenced, leading the captain to believe that it was
probably a false warning. After landing, the captain discovered that the circuit breaker
for the alarm system had been pulled by the flight engineer, that it was not a false
warning, and that the warning could have been potentially serious. The flight engineer
stated that he had asked the captain if he wanted the warning inhibited, and since there
was no reply, he assumed he was complying with the captain's wishes (Foushee, 1982, p.
1064).
In summary, there is strong evidence that the process of interaction is related to
group performance in the cockpit environment. The reader should bear in mind that the
results of the Ruffell Smith (1979}, Foushee and Manos (1981}, and other empirical
studies in this area are based upon realistic flight simulations, where high levels of crew
workload precipitated by carefully controlled events no doubt contributed to the crew
performance problems reported herein. These levels of workload and stress are
characteristic of many accident scenarios, but they are infrequently encountered in day
to day operations. While the results of these studies may be disturbing to some, the
remarkable overall safety of the system should be stressed. Fortunately, the problems
discussed here rarely lead to accidents, which is a testament to overall system
redundancy. It should be comforting to note that since accidents are so infrequent, they
make terrible research criteria for judging crew performance, and it is a credit to the
industry that the primary research and training concern is upon those aspects of
performance which under some circumstances can have dramatic consequences.
Attention is now turned to methods aimed at the facilitation of this process.
ADDRESSING THE ISSUE
Hackman and Morris (1975) suggest that the best way to effect meaningful change
in group performance is to concentrate on input factors. Thus, it is proposed that group
performance strategies can be made more task-appropriate by modifying the group's
norms, that member effort and coordination can be increased by task redesign, and that
the level and utilization of group member knowledge and skill can be improved by
altering the composition of the group.
It was previously noted that the existence of group performance problems is
becoming more salient to the air carrier industry. Several airlines, stimulated by this
awareness, are beginning to address these issues in their training programs, and one
company has made a substantial investment in a comprehensive program of '_cockpit
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resource management" training for all of its pilots. The remainder of this discussion will
focus on some of the techniques utilized in this program, and whether they may be
expected to facilitate the group performance process.
Altering Group Norms
Much of the normative structure of professional pilots is well established, having
evolved during a time when aviation was not routine and the dangers of flight were
considerable. These conditions fostered, largely through self-selection processes, a pilot
profile that has been characterized by Tom Wolfe (1979) as t_the right stuff." An
individual who typifies the right stuff is generally described as a highly goal-oriented,
extremely self-reliant, macho, decisive sort; and it is clear that such a profile was
functional, if not a prerequisite, for the job in the past. Some would argue that reliance
upon others was negatively related to longevity in 'the old days." While it is easy to
visualize such individuals functioning effectively as fighter or test pilots, it is more
difficult to view them as '_good team players." In the past, airlines themselves did little to
discourage captains from functioning in this manner. The 1952 guidelines for pilot
proficiency checks at a major airline explicitly stated that the first officer should not
correct errors made by the captain (H. W. Orlady, personnel communication). To this
day, the Federal Aviation Regulations governing pilot qualifications deal almost
exclusively with the acquisition and maintenance of individual pilot proficiency.
Despite the fact that the aviation environment has changed considerably, these
norms are ubiquitous, and an attempt is being made to alter the normative structure of
the flightcrew in some training programs. One method employed in an effort to correct
certain ineffective task performance strategies, associated with excessive instrumentality,
is the use of videotape feedback and diagnosis of task-specific behaviors. In one
program, crews are asked to fly a full-mission simulation that is videotaped from start to
finish. Following these simulated flights, crewmembers view the tape with an instructor
and discuss such aspects of the group process as the effects of interpersonal styles, the
appropriate delegation of responsibility, and how the role structure can inhibit the input
of subordinate flight crewmembers. From a theoretical standpoint, this approach may
very well produce some tangible change. Dural and Wicklund (1972) in their theory of
objective self awareness, found that self-focusing manipulations often force objective
appraisals of oneself that may lead to attitude and behavior change. Anecdotal evidence
from this program is suggestive of a positive impact, with crewmembers expressing
surprise at their behavior during the videotaped flights.
Another prevalent technique within the industry is the use of seminars as a means
of providing information aimed at altering the normative structure of flightcrews. These
seminars are frequently offered as part of the training required for promotion from junior
crewmember to captain. The philosophy underlying this approach, as well as other
feedback approaches, is that heightened awareness will produce tangible behavior
change. It is not presumed that the personality structures of individuals can be altered
in a short period of time, but it is felt that the pilot socialization process has not
generally produced patterns consistent with teamwork. Thus, it is argued that pilots are
often not aware of how subtle factors can compromise group function. The educational
content generally places a heavy emphasis on material related to the role of interpersonal
styles and the effects of certain types of behavior on co-workers. Group exercises,
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personality assessment and feedback techniques, role-playing, case studies, and
interpersonal encounter drills, are frequently employed.
It may surprise some to discover that these programs are proving to be popular in
airlines that have implemented them, however, serious questions are usually raised as to
their long-term effectiveness. It is probably true that these interventions provide short-
term insight, but long-term change is no doubt dependent on periodic exposure and
reinforcement. Unfortunately, few organizations are providing their personnel with this
type of training on a recurrent basis. Perhaps more disturbing is the dearth of research
dealing with the evaluation or relative efficacy of such programs. Many principles,
which are being t_)reached as the gospel" in such programs, are in need of further study.
Increasing Member Effort and Coordination
Raising individual member effort and coordinating these efforts is another means of
increasing group productivity. One method suggests that restructuring the task, in a
way that requires coordinated performance from all group members, will dictate
increased member effort by necessity and produce normative change. Since flight training
has traditionally emphasized individual skills, most pilots have had very little realistic
experience with high workload or emergency situations that require teamwork. Moreover,
equipment reliability and automation have rendered most flight tasks routine; high
stress, emergency situations are relatively rare. Yet, as has been mentioned, this lack of
experience may be a factor when crews are faced with non-routine situations; a view
which is supported by the incident and accident record.
While it makes little sense to change substantively the task of flying most modern
aircraft considering the remarkable safety record of the present system, it may be logical
to restructure the training task. Many airlines are beginning to utilize a technique
known as Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT; e.g. Lauber & Foushee, 1981) in which
crews fly a complete trip in a high-fidelity simulator. However, unlike the real world,
LOFT scenarios are usually designed to include emergency situations which require the
coordinated actions of all crewmembers for success. These flights occur in real time, and
no intervention is made by the instructor regardless of the actions of the crew. LOFT is
a learning experience in which errors are usually made. However, since effective group
function in this environment is by definition the management of human error, LOFT
provides highly effective crew coordination training. Just as it is necessary to practice
landing skills in order to gain and maintain aircraft-handling proficiency, it is necessary
to practice crew coordination skills in order to assure good flightcrew performance.
LOFT provides the vehicle by which these skills, now recognized as important, are
practiced and maintained. Some air carriers provide LOFT training every six or twelve
months, and this approach may be a more viable way of producing long-term behavior
change.
As Hackman and Morris (1975) suggest, the amount of effort group members put
into a task is also heavily affected by the normative structure of the group. It has been
noted that factors inherent in the role structure of the flightcrew, while necessary for the
effective coordination of responsibilities, sometimes serve to decrease the effort
expenditure of subordinate crewmembers. By changing the norms of the group and
reinforcing the importance of coordinated performance, the malady some refer to as
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"captainitis" may begin to subside, and subordinate crewmembers may find it easier to
have sufficient input into the group process. If these programs accomplish nothing else,
they may have been beneficial by simply heightening awareness of the importance of
leadership styles that encourage the input of all team members. By "legitimizing" this
input or making it a part of the group's values, it is reasonable to expect some increase
in member motivation, at least in the short-term.
Changing Group Composition
Altering the group's composition may be the most effective, and perhaps the most
difficult of means for improving group effectiveness. Yet, it is an inescapable fact that
successful group performance is heavily dependent upon the individual skills of members,
and efforts aimed at the recruitment of qualified individuals has always been one of the
favored means of producing the desired result. There is very little question that most
airline pilots are highly skilled in the technical aspects of their job, but there is concern
about their function as team members. In the United States, the labor pool is comprised
heavily of pilots whose formative years were spent in high performance, single-seat,
military aircraft. It has been suggested that pilots with this type of experience may
bring an individualistic emphasis to the air carrier cockpit and that learning team
member skills can only be accomplished slowly and painfully. One obvious solution
would be the selection of individuals for the position of airline pilot who possess the skills
associated with good leadership or team function.
For the airline industry, this approach has obvious drawbacks, at least in the near-
term. Clearly, it does not address the needs of the present pilot population, since past
selection criteria have not encompassed these abilities. Helmreich (1982) has recently
reported work with a new airline in which both instrumentality and expressiveness were
among the desirable selection criteria for new pilots, but it is too soon to draw any
inferences about the success of such selection practices.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The most practical approach for most companies is to focus upon changing pilot
attitudes and experiences in this domain. The techniques discussed above such as
LOFT, seminars, and feedback are aimed at increasing the skills associated with group
function in flight crewmembers through an increasing awareness of the importance of
these factors. It should be stressed that this is neither a small task, nor is it a short-
term one. The open treatment of issues related to one's interpersonal competence can
be, and has been, very anxiety-provoking for some individuals. No matter how well this
type of training is conducted, certain people will be resistant to change provoking some
critics of these programs to argue that the very individuals who need to improve will not
benefit because they are the ones likely to be threatened.
Organizations that have undertaken resource management training programs report
that after exposure to this training, peer pressure often facilitates change among those
individuals initially unreceptive to the program. At present, training approaches are
entirely non-punitive, but some have suggested that the same standard should be
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applied to interpersonal competence as is .now applied to technical competence. This, of
course, implies a wholesale reevaluation of government and industry practices in the
training and checking areas. Since these training programs are only beginning to be
implemented, and only by a few airlines, we do not know whether they will produce any
meaningful or long-lasting benefits. Nonetheless, it would be foolhardy to suggest that
better knowledge of these issues, and efforts to provide this knowledge to those who
stand to gain, are not a step in the right direction.
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